|Title:||Elections and Strategic Voting: Condorcet and Borda|
|Group/Series/Folder:||Record Group 8.15 - Institute for Advanced Study|
Series 3 - Audio-visual Materials
|Location:||8.15:3 box 1.5|
|Notes:||Institute for Advanced Study Research Seminars.|
Abstract: Prof. Eric Maskin and his research collaborator P. Dasgupta show that there is a sense in which the Condorcet method (simple majority rule) is less vulnerable to strategic voting than any other reasonable voting rule satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). If they drop the requirement of IIA, then Condorcet and the Borda method (rank-order voting) are jointly the least vulnerable to strategizing.
Duration: 100 min.
|Appears in Series:||8.15:3 - Audio-visual Materials|
Videos for Public -- Distinguished Lectures